18 Friendship’s love is “simple” – it is love of something for its very self. 1214, named two forms of “voluntary love ( voluntas dilectio)”: concupiscent love and friendship. Geoffrey of Poitiers, for example, writing c. Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love a (.)ĩThomas identified two kinds of amor: desire’s love ( amor concupiscentiae) and friendship’s love ( amor amicitiae). 23: “Dilectio voluntaria dividitur in duas: p (.) 18 Geoffrey of Poitiers, Summa, BnF cod.For Augustine, the emotions were themselves manifestations of the will: “the will is certainly in all of them, or rather, all are nothing other than wills.” 11 And Augustine continued: “If is turned the wrong way, it will turn these emotions ( hos motus) awry (perversos) but if is straight ( recta), the emotions will be not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.” 12 Augustine thought that after man’s Fall from the Garden of Eden, the will could turn the right way only by the grace of God. However, Thomas’s notion of the will was quite different from that of Augustine. 10 This Thomas was inspired to do so by reading St. Augustine, especially the City of God, where he found some thoughts on the moral potential of the passions and their connections to the human will. dei, 14.6, p. 421: “Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis quia si perversa est, perverso (.)ĥAccording to Mark Jordan, Thomas was the first scholastic to integrate the passions within a discussion (at least implicit) of an Aristotelian scientia moralis, or moral science. ), Turnhout, Brepols, 1955 (Corpus Chris (.) Jordan, “Ideals of Scientia moralis and the Invention of the Summa theologiae”, in Scott Ma (.) Pleasure or joy ( delectatio or gaudium) vs. Table 1: The concupiscible and irascible passionsĭesire ( desiderium) vs. 4 Table 1 gives Thomas’s six concupiscible and five irascible passions. Again, John of La Rochelle may serve as a precedent.
SAEPE HUMANOS AFFECTUS AUT FREE
1245), who asserted that the two kinds of passions pertained to different things but were nevertheless complementary: “The concupiscible is the appetite for pleasurable things … while the irascible power is the appetite to be free of difficult things.” 3 The names of the passions were also fairly well worked out by the time of Thomas. Among the scholastics it was developed in the mid 1230s by John of La Rochelle (d. This taxonomy went back at least to Plato. These in turn were divided into two sorts: the concupiscible and the irascible passions. Although the two appetites were connected, the sensitive part was the “home” of the passions. This had two parts: the intellective appetite (the will) and the sensitive. The passions were, with few exceptions, in the appetitive power. 2 Like Albert the Great, and following Aristotle, Thomas treated emotions as belonging to the “faculties” or “powers” of the soul. Was there anything distinctive about his discussion? (If not, then the question of its effect on practice in non-theoretical works would be moot.) Certainly much of it was derivative. His ideas were most fully worked out in the so-called prima secundae (the first section of the second part) of his Summa theologiae. 2 co. However, note that within the (.)ĢThomas did not, to be sure, talk about “emotions.” Rather he wrote about the passions: the passiones animae (passions of the soul).
3 John of La Rochelle, Summa de anima 106, in Jacques Guy Bougerol ( ed.2 Many of my observations here are borrowed from Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Phi (.).
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